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Institutional Regimes, Long Wave 
Systemic Risk and Great 
International Crisis of 2008-2012 
 
Summary: This paper studies the relationship between long-term growth of 
GDP per capita, institutional regimes of accumulation (ROA), systemic risk and
the Great International Crisis of 2008-2010. The principle hypothesis behind 
the work is that the ROA provides a foundation for long-term growth as a type 
of fundamental variable, and that this growth provides a buffer against systemic 
risk in the sense that sustainable growth provides resources for debt provision
and employment stimulation. The emergence of a viable ROA is crucial for long
waves of growth which stimulate both private sector profit and public sector tax 
receipts which (using conventional terminology) reduce the structural deficit for
both sectors. Low rates of long-term growth, therefore, provide a good indicator 
of the emergence of “long wave systemic risk” (LWSR), which left such nations 
vulnerable to uncertainty, financial crisis and recession. The paper investigates
the inability of growth for various decades to “cover” instabilities associated
with the Great Crisis, leading to high rates of LWSR, especially for European 
and North American nations that bore the brunt of the crisis.
Key words: Institutional regimes, Long wave systemic risk, Great international
crisis. 






This paper scrutinises a theme which various authors in Panoeconomicus have been 
highlighting, namely the systemic and structural origins of the Great International 
Crisis and Recession (GIC) of 2008-12 (e.g. Timur Han Gur, Naci Canpolat, and 
Huseyin Ozel 2011). We start by surveying the performance of the World Economy 
and continents in terms of the degree of severity and instability of the crisis and re-
cession. Then we indicate the causal processes involved in the differential impact of 
the GIC, emanating from the institutional environment of the various regions and 
continents. Then in the third section we estimate long wave systemic risk (LWSR) for 
specific areas and continents as well as various nations of Europe, North America 
and elsewhere vis-à-vis their ability to “cover” financial instabilities through longer-
run growth patterns. We base our analysis partly on scrutinising the rate of growth of 
GDP per capita for all continents and numerous nations in the Maddison and World 
Bank WDI databases for 1950-2010, 1990-2010, 2000-2010, 2008-2010 and 2009 
periods, respectively. Table 1, below, starts the story by outlining the annual rate of 
change of GDP per capita during the 2000s.  
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Table 1   GDP Growth Rates Per Capita, 2000-2010 Annual Rates, World and Regions 
 
      2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007      2008 2009 2010 
World  2.92 0.34 0.71 1.44 2.85 2.35 2.82 2.74 0.33  -3.16 3.05 
High  income  3.36 0.60 0.85 1.30 2.51 1.90 2.18 1.82  -0.56  -4.21 2.49 
European  Union  3.66 1.79 0.91 0.89 2.06 1.49 2.79 2.48 0.00  -4.63 1.59 
East  Eur&C.Asia  3.91 1.72 1.29 1.36 2.67 2.07 3.27 2.93 0.34  -4.68 1.85 
North  America  3.11 0.11 0.95 1.56 2.58 2.11 1.70 0.95  -0.91  -3.53 2.15 
Middle  income  4.06 1.78 2.51 4.38 6.34 6.06 6.96 7.51 4.71 1.59 6.49 
LACA  2.45  -0.93  -1.69 0.85 4.74 3.63 4.57 4.64 3.16  -2.91 5.01 
East  Asia  &  Pacific  3.57 0.94 2.06 2.71 4.07 3.64 4.29 5.07 1.74  -1.26 6.38 
MENA  2.68  -0.18  0.1 3.21 4.41 3.46 3.45 3.38 3.31 0.39  ..n.a. 
Low  income  1.23 2.85 0.88 1.62 3.86 3.89 4.18 4.21 3.50 2.52 3.67 
South  Asia  2.44 2.86 2.04 5.92  6.3 7.16 7.08 7.47 3.24 6.61 7.31 
SS  Africa  1.05 1.14 0.86 1.64 3.51 3.15 3.67 4.03  2.5  -0.41 2.23 
 
Source: Adapted from raw data in World Bank (2011). 
 
The first stylized fact, identifiable from this Table, is that the severity and in-
stability of the crisis - during 2009 and during 2007-2010 - was closely correlated 
with the level of socioeconomic development of the region. The most badly affected 
areas were the relatively high income regions of especially Western Europe, North 
America and Eastern Europe; variously called the Core (in a CPSP model). These 
highly developed areas had the most rapidly growing and/or highly dominant finan-
cial institutions and market conditions. These areas were intimately connected with 
the major financial innovations of the 1990s and 2000s, especially the growth of in-
vestment banks, collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and subprime mortgage mar-
ket bonds (SMMBs). The regions that were both rapidly opening themselves up to 
international capital and also those regions already heavily penetrated by investment 
banking institutions were the hardest hit in terms of rate of growth of GDP per capita 
over the 2008-2010 period, with special emphasis on growth during 2009, the deep-
est year of the international recession. 
The Middle Income areas, or the Semi-Periphery (SP), were affected usually 
moderately during the whole of 2008-2010, This includes most of the nations of 
South America, plus East Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. These areas 
had a moderate level of development of financial capital, neither high nor low, and 
were only moderately linked into the innovative financial relationships of modern 
capitalism. Network relationships between households/corporations and financial 
institutions were only partially innovative and path-breaking. As a result, the degree 
of instability and low growth were moderate. 
The low income areas - the Periphery - were mostly unaffected or much less 
affected by the Great Crisis - having few major financial innovations and a much 
lower level of financial sophistication. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (as well 
as Central America and the Caribbean) were of this type. Having a relatively low  
3  Institutional Regimes, Long Wave Systemic Risk and Great International Crisis of 2008-2012 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2012, 1, pp. 1-12
level of sophistication in manufacturing they also tend to have a relatively low level 
of sophistication in finance. In these areas, major financial institutions such as in-
vestment banks, mortgage backed securities and collateralised debt obligations have 
not become dominant during the 2000s. Having less financial deepening led to less 
financial instability, and as a result fewer chains of bankruptcy for industry and the 
housing sector. 
 
1. Institutional Regimes of Accumulation, 1950-2010 
 
The main hypothesis of this paper is that the depth and instability of the subprime 
crisis and recession is related to institutional regimes of accumulation. In other 
words, the depth and instability of the crisis is positively related to the style and 
phase of accumulation and growth of the system. Here we link the depth/instability 
of the crisis at the regional level to long-term rates of growth, as an indicator of long-
term fundamentals which influence systemic risk. Table 2, below, outlines the GDP 
Growth per capita (AAGR) performance of the regions over several decades: 
 
Table 2   Average Annual Real GDP Growth Per Capita (Decadal Annual Averages), World, 
Continents: 1950–2010 
 
  World EU  NA  EE MENA  LACA  SSA Asia 
1950-59  2.68 4.03 2.09 3.68 3.49 2.03 1.82 3.82 
1961-69  3.09 4.03 3.21 3.68 3.90 2.59 2.09 3.77 
1970-79  2.01 2.94 2.60 3.26 5.77 3.19 1.30 3.39 
1980-89  1.36  1.99  2.06  0.22 –1.63 0.19 –0.68 2.96 
1990-99  1.22  1.88  1.91 –0.70 2.07  1.18 –0.60 2.87 
2000-10  1.49 1.18 1.08 4.46* 2.42 2.35 2.34 4.32 
 
Note: EU=European Union, NA=North America, EE=Eastern Europe, MENA=Middle East & North Africa, LACA=Latin 
America & Caribbean, SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2011), Maddison (2001, 2006), O’Hara (2012).  
 
  Table 3 outlines the long wave taxonomies, below: 
 
Table 3   Wave Typologies: Periodicity and Amplitude 
 
Wave Type  Acronym  GDP per capita growth rate %  Short wave  Long wave  Jumbo long wave 
Very high  




40 years  High wave  
upswing  HWU 4.01—6.00  10  years 
Wave upswing  WU  2.51—4.00  10 years 
Borderline (B)  BW 2.01—2.50  10  years  BLW,  
20-30 yr  JBLW 





Deep wave  
downswing  DWD 0.01—1.00  10  years 
Very deep  
wave upswing  VDWD  00.00 & <  10 years 
 
Source: The author’s original work. 
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The above data from Table 2 and long wave taxonomies from Table 3 are now 
linked to the phases of the long wave that the regions have been undergoing, as 
shown in Table 4, below: 
 
Table 4   GDP Growth Per Capita (Decadal AAGR) Wave Periodicities and Amplitudes, World,  
Continents: 1950–2010    
 
  World EU  NA  EE  MENA  LACA SSA Asia 
1951-59 





JLWU  1961-69 
LWU LWU 
B 
1970-79 B    LWD 
1980-89 
LWD 











Note: *** Main areas of GIC. 
Source: Adapted from the raw data of World Bank (2011), Angus Maddison (2001, 2007). 
 
Comparing Table 1 with Table 4, we find a direct relationship between long-
term growth the depth/instability of the GIC at the regional level. The two most 
heavily affected areas, EU and NA, have been going through an evolutionary change 
from long wave upswing from the 1950s/60s to the 1970s to long wave downswing 
(possibly via borderline conditions) from the 1980s to the 2000s. This drop in the 
growth rate is directly linked to their becoming the most heavily affected areas in 
terms of the depth/instability of the Great Crisis: during 2009 and also 2008-10. The 
most heavily affected areas, these two especially, have moved from upswing to 
downswing, manifested in low rates of growth. These low rates of growth are linked 
to several institutional developments, mostly especially the (a) neoliberal trend of 
cutting productive government spending (Steve Pressman 2007), (b) dominance of 
finance over industry (Matias Binswanger 2009; Englebert Stockhammer and Lukas 
Grafl 2010), (c) relatively low rates of investment/GDP in the regime of accumula-
tion (UNCTAD 2003), (d) maturation of the economy as the consumer durables 
Fordist system of production and distribution gave way to flexible and neo-Taylorist 
growth (Phillip Anthony O’Hara 2006), and (e) the inability to innovate in the Core 
to create sustainable systems of profit (Andrew Tylecote 2010).  
The model of development for the most heavily affected areas relates to core 
industrial maturity and the inability to develop a new and innovative regime of ac-
cumulation (see O’Hara 2010). Areas will be subject to differential growth patterns 
according to their structural and dynamic place in the changing regime of accumula-
tion. In brief, this represents a structurally declining rate of GDP growth per capita 
for the Core as they have an ineffectual ROA; mostly borderline or slightly higher 
growth for the semi-peripheral and peripheral areas of MENA, LACA, and SSA; and 
long wave upswing for Asia and some numerous nations in several other areas (e.g. 
Botswana, Egypt, Chile, Norway and Iran) (O’Hara 2012). 
Central and Eastern Europe (generally) moved from long wave upswing dur-
ing the 1950s-70s onto long wave downswing into the 1980s and 1990s, moving into 
very long wave downswing into the 1990s. Having experienced rapid privatisation, 
market growth and growing financial sophistication this area moved into dubious 
financial relationships which made them even more subject to instability than in the  
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Core proper (EU, NA). Much of the growth of the 2000s was in rebound from the 
massive dislocation of the 1990s; hence their institutions have been relatively unsta-
ble, with market relations—and corruption—often dominating industry as financial 
motives and oligarchies gain at the expense of long-term growth. Being subject to 
more potential instability than the Core proper they were thus more adversely af-
fected by the crisis, at least in the critical year 2009; although they have rebounded 
strongly (as unstable systems often do) from the worst depths of the crisis to high 
growth in 2010. This youthful market energy is thus subjecting them to greater insta-
bility, although this 2010 and 2000-10 growth may indicate a greater potential to re-
bound than the Core of Western Europe and North America. 
MENA and SSA were affected by the Great Crisis only moderately, since 
growth has moved from short and long wave downswing, respectively, into border-
line performance, even going as far as long wave borderline in MENA. They have 
emerged from the crisis not too bad as growth was moderate while having industry 
dominate finance or at least a degree of dynamic balance between the two was the 
rule. Finance is not that sophisticated in these areas, especially SSA, so the degree of 
speculative bubble growth and crash was minimal or lacking altogether. Major finan-
cial innovations of a avante gard type, such as CDOs, MBS and sophisticated in-
vestment banks, were relatively lacking, and relatively weak networks associated 
with Core-nations’ financial institutions were typical of these areas. Debt has moder-
ate over the recent decade, especially in SSA, as during the late 1990s and early 
2000s debt relief was instituted and the same type/degree of household debt on mort-
gages has not happened as occurred in the Core. Both these areas, MENA and SSA, 
emerged from the 2000s with some optimism, which perhaps stimulated (to some 
degree) the revolutionary movements in MENA to oust corrupt and long-standing 
strong-armed regimes, such as in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Lebanon.  
Areas much less affected by the Great Crisis were mostly in the periphery and 
semi-periphery. Semi-Peripheral areas such as China and many other areas of Asia 
(including especially South Asia such as India) have being undergoing Jumbo Long 
Wave Upswing over the past 60 years. Their growth has been impressive as growth 
actually rose in the area during the 1990s and 2000s, as the nations of this area 
mostly undergo a sustainable regime of accumulation. This regime of accumulation 
includes institutions associated with: (a) the mass movement of people from the 
countryside to the cities and urban areas; (b) a mass production labor-computer re-
gime of accumulation promoting high profit and demand; (c) relatively low wages 
(compared to the Core) but gradually rising especially for the middle class; (d) a bal-
ance between finance and industry or perhaps with industry dominating finance; (e) a 
state system encouraging private enterprise and also productive state activities such 
as infrastructure, education, health and monetary/fiscal policy, as well as (f) a com-
petitive system of trade and industry (O’Hara 2006a). In these areas, growth is high, 
profits for industry are sufficient and nowhere does finance dominate industry. As a 
result, long wave systemic risk is lower than other areas (at least in relation to these 
factors), speculative bubbles are less abundant, and financial-economic instability 
and crisis are less intense or lacking. 
  
6  Phillip Anthony O’Hara 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2012, 1, pp. 1-12 
The principle link between the ROA, waves and financial conditions in this 
system of political economy is growth. This long wave and ROA approach starts by 
postulating that conditions of growth impact on the financial conditions of the econ-
omy. High and stable rates of GDP growth per capita, in this analysis, provide a basis 
for crucial fundamental values upon which the viability of the state and private sec-
tors depend. As Christian Suter (1992) and Martin Wolfson (1994) have shown, long 
wave conditions of growth impact on the systemic risk of the system and nations. We 
follow a standard line of argument among long wave analysts, for instance, Suter 
(1992, p. 79) who found in his study that “low economic growth contributes to a high 
probability of debt-service problems”; not only in the debt crises of the periphery and 
semi-periphery of the 1980s and 1990s, but also in core economies where finance 
dominates industry through long wave downswing. Low growth, profits and invest-
ment share of GDP characterize the long wave downswing conditions currently im-
pacting on major nations and regions - especially the EU and NA - plus the world as 
a whole. These long wave downswings increase the level of uncertainty in the econ-
omy, leading in the Periphery and Semi-Periphery, as well as the Core, to debt crises 
of varying severity. The low growth rates (of World Income) limit profit and invest-
ment, stimulating periodic financial crises and deep recessions. The debt crises were 
deep in the Periphery and Semi-Periphery, during the 1980s and 1990s; and they 
have been periodically quite deep also in the Core every decade or so, especially dur-
ing the current Great International Crisis. Low growth increases dept burden by re-
ducing both profit rates (through declining demand) and government budget sur-
pluses (declining tax receipts).  
The Core areas of Western Europe and North America were largely affected 
by the GIC because they were in long wave downswing where finance dominated 
industry, profit was relatively low and where no viable regime of accumulation has 
been emerging over recent decades. It was mostly the case with Eastern Europe as 
well; however, their evolutionary dynamics are somewhat different from the rest of 
Europe (and North America) because they are still in transition to a largely market 
system of economics, but still one where finance dominates industry and no viable 
regime of accumulation has yet emerged to propel long wave upswing; they currently 
are undergoing short wave upswing of an unstable nature. Instead of following the 
line of systemic risk of, say, the European Systemic Risk Board (2011), which con-
centrates on macroprudential risk (important though that is), or that of Oliver De 
Bandt and Philipp Hartmann (1998) who concentrate on shocks to the system, this 
current study, following other long wave research, looks to the workings of the re-
gime of accumulation for evidence of a specific type of systemic risk: long wave sys-
temic risk, LWSR. LWSR, we argue, is the systemic basis of much of the financial 
instability and crises of recent decades, including the GIC. We scrutinise this hy-
pothesis empirically in the two sections that follow. 
 
2. Long Wave Systemic Risk for Continents and Regions 
 
This section outlines the relationship between the unstable dynamics of the World 
System and its regions and communities as it relates to the process of management of 
debt and risk. Over the short and long waves, growth in income per capita provides a  
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foundation for debt and risk, as growth of income changes in the long-term so too 
does the process of systemic risk. The principle of increasing risk shows that over the 
course of long waves certain institutional changes emerge. The boom in the short 
cycle leads usually to increasing debt and uncertainty which is of course linked to the 
process of changing from long wave upswing to downswing. In this context, we ex-
amine some data relating to this risk as it emerged through the 1990s and 2000s, 
culminating in the ongoing Great International Crisis of 2008-2012. 
This section empirically develops an analysis of LWSR over the past decade, 
paying special attention to this in relation to the GIC in the recent context. Based on 
critically scrutinising the rate of growth of GDP per capita for all 228 nations in-
cluded in the WDI database for 1990-2010, 2000-2010 and 2008-2010 periods, and 
associated continents and the World, we compare: (i) GDP growth per capita for the 
year 2009, with (ii) growth per capita for the years 2008-2010, and also with (iii) 
growth for the 2000-2010 period, and (iv) growth for the period 1990-2010 (in the 
context of the 1950-2010 wave). The reason for including these four time periods lies 
in the need to make an estimate of LWSR for the World, its major continents/regions, 
and also some selected nations. 
We specifically link LWSR with the ability of the growth process to provide 
enough funds to finance debt and other resources for the future. We define LWSR in 
this context as the extent to which growth covers the need for these resources. Essen-
tially we define LWSR as the extent to which (higher than average) growth is able to 
provide resources for citizens to utilise in whatever manner they choice collectively 
to do. These collective goods may very well be privatised for the benefit of its major 
classes, genders and cultures. LWSR as with income-sustaining systems require vari-
ous collective goods for them to operate minimally.  
Table 5, below, compares various continents or regions of the World vis-a-vis 
these four data sets relating to covered growth. The concept of covered growth is the 
extent to which growth has been sustained long enough to provide funds and for po-
tential resources (including debt and the financing of debt burden; to sustain profit 
rate and government surpluses). In this we ascertain [1] the yearly growth for 2009 in 
basis points (BP), [2] cumulative 3-yearly growth for 2008-10 in BP, [3] the 11-year, 
2000-10 AAGR, [4] the extent to which cumulative growth in 2008-10 covers 
growth in 2009, and the extent to which average annual growth 2000-10 covers cu-
mulative growth in 2008-10, [5] the extent to which “[4]” growth coverage levels are 
sufficient, [6] the wave position during 1990-2010, and [7] an estimate for long wave 
systemic risk. 
What this table shows is that the different areas have different levels of 
LWSR, defined as the potential of the growth to cover debt and employment. If aver-
age or cumulative growth is too low then existing debt and the additional debt caused 
by the low growth will enhance LWSR. If average or cumulative growth is high then 
the ability of growth to cover debt is high and therefore LWSR is low. We have 
proxied LWSR in this way to assess it for the World and the regions or continents. 
The findings are that, in the light of the Great International Crisis of 2009 and also 
2008-2010 as a whole, as the main hypothesis indicated, LWSR is highest in the 
European Union and North America. This means that these regions are much more  
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likely to be involved in systemic crises in the light of debt problems and problems of 
low growth such as higher unemployment. LWSR is slightly higher in the EU than 
North America, suggesting a greater chance of systemic crisis in the EU. 
 
Table 5   Covered GDP Growth, Wave Position and Long Wave Systemic Risk, Basis Points of 
Growth, 2009, 2008-2010, 2000-2010, 1950-2010; World, Continents / Regions 
 
  [1]  




















(a) 2008-10  
covers 09 











very low, 2.50-0.00 
EU  -463  -101 118 (a) -564, (b) 17 (a) No, (b) No LWD HIGH, 9.5 
N.America  -353  -75 108 (a) -428, (b) 33 (a) No, (b) No LWD HIGH, 9.2 
EE & CA  -468  -83 167 (a) -551, (b) 84 (a) No, (b) Yes LWD,SWU MEDIUM-HIGH, 8.7 
      
World  -316  7 149 (a) -309, (b) 156 (a) No, (b) Yes LWD MEDIUM, 7.2 
LACA  -291  175 235 (a) -116, (b) 410 (a) No, (b) Yes LWD, B MEDIUM, 6.8 
SSA  -041  077 234 (a) 036, (b) 411 (a) No, (b) Yes LWD, B LOW MEDIUM, 6.0 
      
MENA  39  123 242 (a) 84, (b) 365 (a) Yes, (b) Yes B LOW, 4.5 
East Asia  -126  686 332 (a) 560, (b) 1018 (a) Yes, (b) Yes LWU LOW, 3.5 
South Asia  661  328 531 (a) 989, (b) 859 (a) Yes, (b) Yes LWU VERY LOW, 1.5 
 
Source:  The author’s original work; based around data from Table 2. 
 
The potential for growth to cover debt - LWSR - is of a medium value in the 
World as a whole, plus Latin America and the Caribbean and also Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia. This indicates that a global crisis is perhaps not that likely, at least 
not yet, while systemic crisis is unlikely to develop in LACA and EE. However, if 
contagion does spread from the EU to North America it could easily affect LACA 
and also EE which are really regional-alliances of the EU and NA, respectively. Due 
to the interdependencies involved, this medium level of risk can easily rise in the 
face of systemic collapse of the core. LWSR can grow in a tipping point manner due 
to the contagious interdependencies between regions, especially LACA vis-a-vis 
North America and EE vis-a-vis the EU. 
SSA emerges from the analysis with a “low medium” level of LWSR, which 
is a few notches below medium. This is because the SSA has emerged from twenty 
years of long wave downswing to a borderline position in between downswing and 
upswing. This represents an improvement in performance and hence a drop in 
LWSR. Perhaps surprisingly, MENA has dropped to a low level of LWSR into the 
2010s, a few notches higher in risk than the even lower level for East Asia and espe-
cially South Asia. MENA has recovered somewhat from the short wave downswing 
of the 1980s through twenty years of long wave borderline performance during the 
1990s-2000s. This is a substantial improvement and may well have contributed to the 
higher aspirations of social and political change emerging in the areas through the 
revolutions in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen and some other nations in MENA. 
Asia as a whole has a low level of LWSR as we move into the 2010s. Nations 
of South Asia, such as India, tend to have an even lower level of risk than many in 
East Asia, such as Malaysia. The Asian continent as a whole is undergoing the most 
rapid transformation into six decades of long wave upswing, with an expanded  
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growth into the 2000s as India expands higher. This greater performance reduces 
LWSR because the higher growth is also fairly durable and subject to lower levels of 
uncertainty than the other regions. This lower uncertainly translates into lower sys-
temic risk, and hence very low potential for LWSR in Asia.  
As Paul Davidson (2009) and many post-Keynesian institutionalists (PKIs) 
have argued, inadequate systems of demand and supply have lead to periodic high 
levels of uncertainty (and visa versa) and precautionary demand for money, and low 
investment in the core plus the World as a whole. Non-ergodic systems lead to an 
environment of uncertainty where risk is incalculable. Yet some insights into uncer-
tainty, specifically as a form of systemic risk, can be generated using data for World 
Income or especially GDP growth per capita. A sustainable or unsustainable regime 
of accumulation impacts on LWSR, which impacts back on growth levels in a bio-
feedback manner. While the Core, as a result, has low levels of fundamental values, 
and hence high levels of LWSR, other areas as noted in this paper have more positive 
regimes of accumulation where systems of demand and supply stimulate income and 
wealth in the long-term. Such is especially the case with parts of Asia and numerous 
other nations in several continents. 
However, as the LWSR for the World is medium, this indicates that a conta-
gion moving from Europe to North America, and then into South America and East-
ern Europe/Central Asia, could impact on other regions, especially the Middle East 
and North Africa plus possibly SSA and even Asia. The impact on Asia is likely to 
be moderate perhaps cutting short-term growth in half, which would likely still be in 
the vicinity of long wave upswing but at a lower level. A global crisis could emerge, 
which affects the continents to the degree that the regions experience LWSR. The 
Core is likely to be the most highly affected; followed by nations in Eastern Europe 
and LACA. Then if the crisis becomes protracted likely also MENA will be in-
volved, and to a lesser degree SSA. Asia will likely be moderately affected without 
this becoming extreme. The likelihood of World long wave systemic risk rising to 
high levels due to tipping points will majorly affect those with high and also medium 
levels of LWSR.  
 
3. Long Wave Systemic Risk in Europe, North America and 
Japan 
 
Here we examine the nations least covered by growth to finance their debt levels. 
Special reference is given to LWSR in the European Union, North America, Eastern 
Europe and Japan. We assess the nations mostly affected by long wave systemic risk. 
This provides some context within which the current debt crisis in Europe and Amer-
ica is playing out, which nations are especially vulnerable (and which are not), and 
how deep the problem may be in these regions. We commence the analysis in the 
same way as the previous section, by calculating the covered growth for 2008 com-
pared, respectively, with 2008-2010, 2000-2010, and 1990-2010 (linked to the 1950-
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Table 6   Growth Coverage, Waves, and Systemic Risk, Worst Affected Nations Extent of 2009 
Growth Covered by 2008-2010 Growth, 2008-2010 Growth Covered by 2000-2010 Growth 
(vis-à-vis LW Position) 
 






annual growth BP 
Growth coverage BP 
(a) 2008-10 covers 09, 
(b) 2000-10 covers 08-10 
Coverage adequate? 
(a) 2008-10 covers 09, 








(high = 10.00– 
7.51) 




LWD Ultra high,  
9.8 




LWD Ultra high,  
9.7 




SWD, SWU Ultra high,  
9.5 




LWU, SWD Ultra high,  
9.5 




LWD Very high,  
9.2 




LWU, SWD Very high,  
9.1 




LWU, SWD Very high,  
9.0 




SWD, SWU Very high,  
9.0 




LWD Med high,  
8.7 




LWD Med high,  
8.5 




SWD, B Med high,  
8.3 




SWD, SWU High lower,  
7.9 




SWD, SWU High lower,  
7.7 




LWD High lower,  
7.6 
 
Source: The author’s original work; based around raw data of World Bank (2011). 
 
In this model, there are thus three main factors determining the LWSR level 
for nations around the period 2008-12, namely, the coverage level for 2008-2010, the 
coverage level for 2000-2010, and the position of the nation in the wave situation 
over the past two decades (linked to the 60 year data). Based on these criteria, we 
have four groups of nations. At the top are those with the highest LWSR as deter-
mined by growth coverage, including Iceland, Italy, Latvia and Ireland. Based on 
their growth coverage, they have the highest level of LWSR at “ultra high”, and 
hence the greatest potential for systemic crisis into the near future; Iceland having 
moved into this environment during the subprime crisis itself and Italy recently. The 
second-tier include the UK, Portugal, Norway and Estonia, with LWSR rates of 9.0 - 
9.2, which have the second-highest systemic risk at “very high”, and are therefore 
well primed for systemic crisis into the near future; Portugal has already moved into 
this environment. The group of nations with the third highest level of LWSR at 
“high” with rates of 8.3 - 8.7 systemic risk, are those fairly well-placed to move into 
systemic crisis in the near future, including Japan, US and Greece; in fact, Greece 
has already moved into that environment. Currently the whole of the EU seems to be 
going through a systemic crisis of low growth, high debt and intractable uncertainty 
that may become extreme and affect further areas of the region and World. 
The US, it could be said, being the origin of the subprime crisis and the GIC, 
moved into systemic crisis during the subprime crisis itself in 2008-09, and arguably 
is still in systemic crisis; although very tentative signs of recovery have emerged in  
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the last few months. The fourth group of nations, including Lithuania, Russia and 
Sweden, have high-medium levels of systemic risk and are perhaps less likely to 
move autonomously into systemic crisis in the near future due to their relatively 
lower levels of systemic risk; although they could easily move into systemic crisis 




The purpose of this paper has been to analyse the relationship between the short and 
long-run growth performance of nations and continents and their susceptibility to 
high levels of long wave systemic risk and hence systemic crisis. We started with a 
detailed taxonomy of wave-position in the short and long-runs, and recognised that 
the World has been undergoing long wave downswing over the past 3 decades, as has 
the European Union and also over the past 2 decades North America and Japan. 
Eastern Europe moved from long wave downswing in the 1980s-90s to short wave 
upswing in the 2000s. Three areas, MENA, LACA, and SSA have moved from 
downswing into borderline conditions, LACA and SSA over the past decade and 
MENA over the past 2 decades; which indicates a considerable improvement in long-
run conditions. Asia is the only continent having undergone Jumbo long wave up-
swing, over the past 60 years. 
We then devised a “long wave systemic risk” apparatus based on the ability of 
the continents, regions and nations to utilise growth as a way of financing their debt 
levels and employment requirements. We found, in this context, that the continents 
with the highest LWSR were the European Union and North America, regions most 
affected by the subprime crisis and the GIC. It is therefore understandable that they 
were found to also have the highest rate of LWSR. The regions with a medium rate 
of growth over recent years and decades were moderately affected by the crisis, and 
had medium levels of LWSR, including South America, Sub-Saharan Africa and to a 
lesser degree the Middle East and North Africa. And the regions with the highest 
performance in terms of long wave upswing had the lowest level of LWSR and were 
relatively unaffected by the crisis, including especially East and South Asia. 
This is the first time that a type of systemic risk and system-crisis has been 
specifically related to the position of continents, regions and nations in the short and 
long wave situations. We investigate the nature of systemic risk in a long-term 
growth context. The results indicate a good approximation of wave and performance 
to LWSR. Nations and regions need to be especially cognizant of the problems of 
building debt in an environment of low performance and hence high long wave sys-
temic risk. No longer can we take only the short cycle upswing as a basis for deter-
mining financial positions and debt. Rather, we must look to long-run performance as 
a basis for long wave systemic risk and hence crisis likelihood. This is the main mes-
sage of this paper. The inability of the Core to develop a viable regime of accumula-
tion increases LWSR for them and the World, as parts of the periphery and semi-
periphery undergo moderate long-term growth and hence middle levels of long wave 
systemic risk, and many parts of Asia plus numerous nations in different areas un-
dergo a vibrant regime of accumulation and hence low levels of LWSR but without 
pushing the World sufficiently in a very positive direction over the past 30 years.  
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